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ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK
I. INTRODUCTION

On August 2, 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held in CaliforniaFirstAmendment Coalition v. Woodford' that the
public has a First Amendment right to view lethal injection
executions from the moment an inmate enters the execution chamber
until their death.2 Prior to this decision, all events were held behind
the curtain. Witnesses can now view the inmate entering the
on a gurney, and having intravenous lines
chamber, being secured
3
veins.
his
into
inserted
This decision marks a departure from the manner in which
executions were normally carried out since 1992. 4 In 1992, the San
Quentin State Prison implemented Procedure 770, which allowed
witnesses to view the execution only from the moment the prison
officials strapped the inmate to the gurney with5 the saline
intravenous lines already inserted in the inmate's veins.
Extending the right to view executions by holding Procedure
770 unconstitutional 6 raises issues concerning (1) the history of
public executions; (2) the interests and rights involved in extending
the right to view executions; and (3) the effect this decision may
have in the future. The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the
significance and impact of Woodford upon the interests and rights of
the public, the media, the inmate, and the government via the prison
officials.

1. 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
2. Id. at 877.
3. See generally id. at 871 (describing the events of the execution
process).
4. See Cal. First Amendment Coalition v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 976, 979
(9th Cir. 1998).
5. Id.
6. Woodford, 299 F.3d at 885.
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The procedural history of Woodford dates back to 1996, when
witnesses viewed lethal injection executions after the execution team
members left the execution chamber and the prison officials secured
the inmate on the gurney. 7 The first lethal injection execution
following the adoption of Procedure 770 was administered to
William Bonin.8 First Amendment Coalition (Coalition) filed a suit
in federal court following Bonin's execution challenging Procedure
770, and the court issued a preliminary injunction that the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. 9 The injunction prohibited prison officials from
preventing witnesses from observing executions before the time the
prison officials inserted the intravenous lines until just after the
inmate's death.1 0
After issuing the preliminary injunction, the district court
ordered a permanent injunction allowing witnesses to view
executions "'at least from the point in time just prior to the
condemned being immobilized, that is strapped to the gurney or
other apparatus of death, until the point in time just after the prisoner
dies." A However, on appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded the decision. 12 Although the appellate court found
Procedure 770 constitutional based on the limited record before it, it
needed further analysis by the district court to determine if
substantial evidence existed to show that Procedure 770 was an
exaggerated response to the prison officials' concerns. 13 The district
court subsequently held that the findings supported a permanent
injunction "'from preventing uninterrupted viewing of executions
chamber...
from the moment the condemned enters the execution
14
[until] the time the condemned is declared dead.""

7. See Calderon, 150 F.3d at 979.

8. Woodford, 299 F.3d at 871.

9. Id. at871-72.
10. Id. at 871.
11. Id. at 872 (quoting Cal. First Amendment Coalition v. Calderon, 956 F.
Supp. 883, 890 (N.D. Cal. 1997)).
12. Id.
13. Woodford, 299 F.3d at 872 (citing Cal. First Amendment Coalition v.
Calderon, 150 F.3d 976, 982-83 (9th Cir. 1998)).
14. Id. (quoting Cal. First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, No. C-961291-VRW, 2000 WL 33173913, at '11 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2000)).
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Coalition appealed the decision, seeking to prevent prison
officials from restricting witnesses from viewing the execution from
the time the inmate enters the execution chamber.' 5 This was the
issue in Woodford. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district
court's findings under the clear error standard. Under this standard,
findings are left undisturbed unless there is a "'definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed."",16 In addition, the
appellate court
reviewed de novo whether Procedure 770 was
17
constitutional.
III. REASONING OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

The Ninth Circuit began its reasoning by.establishing that the
press has a First Amendment right to access information available to
the general public. 18 Additionally, the press and the public have a
statutory right to witness executions. 19 The appellate court found
that Coalition could challenge the constitutionality of Procedure 770
by asserting a First Amendment right of access to view executions.2 °
In order to decide whether the right to witness executions
overrides the rights of the media and penological objectives, the
appellate court utilized the test articulated in Turner v. Safley, 2 1 as
22
well as an additional requirement iterated in Thornburgh v. Abbott.
The Ninth Circuit conceded that courts have used the Turner test
when "reviewing a challenge to a prison regulation." 23 The court in
this case applied the test "where the regulation promulgated by
prison officials [was] centrally concerned
with restricting the rights
24
of [the media] rather than prisoners."

15. See id.
16. Id.at 873 (quoting Jones v. United States, 127 F.3d 1154, 1156 (9th
Cir. 1997)).
17. Id.at 872.
18. See id. at 873 n.2.
19. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3605 (Deering 2002).
20. Woodford, 299 F.3d at 873.
21. 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).
22. Woodford, 299 F.3d at 879 (explaining that when "regulations... are
broad in nature and do not require substantial case-by-case discretion must
exhibit a closer fit to their purported purposes.").
23. See id.
at 878.
24. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit's first inquiry was whether the restriction was
reasonable or exaggerated considering the asserted interests.
The
appellate court analyzed this first inquiry by answering the four
questions of the Turner test: (1) is there a rational connection
between the government interest and the prison regulation; (2) are
there alternate means of exercising the rights open to inmates; (3)
what is the impact of accommodating the asserted rights on inmates
and guards; and (4) are there alternatives "that fully [accommodate]
the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological
interests.",26 However, the appellate court substituted
the rights of
27
the prison inmates for the rights of the media.
The Ninth Circuit added a second inquiry to the analysis because
it was the first time the court applied the Turner test to the media's
rights.28 As articulated in Abbott, the appellate court required "a
'closer fit' between Procedure 770 and defendants' legitimate
penological interest in the security of the execution team." 29
The Ninth Circuit found that because the connection between
the penological interest and the regulation was too remote, the first
prong of the Turner test failed. 30 The appellate court reasoned that
the prison officials' concern for safety and security was not
supported by evidence showing that they could be subject to
danger. 31 Additionally, Coalition showed that at the time before the
prison officials inserted the intravenous lines and fastened the inmate
securely on the gurney, the officials had their backs turned to the
witnesses, making identification unlikely.32 Coalition argued that the
inmate also had the opportunity to tell others who the staff members
were before the execution took place, which posed more of a danger
than when the public witnessed the execution after the inmate was

25. Id. at 873.

26.
27.
28.
29.
1002,

Turner,482 U.S. at 89-91 (alteration in original).
See Woodford, 299 F.3d at 878.
See id. at 878-89.
Id. at 878-80; see also Entm't Network, Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F. Supp. 2d
1017 (S.D. Ind. 2001) ("Turnerapplies to all circumstances in which the

needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights." (quoting
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990))).

30. Woodford, 299 F.3d at 881-83.
3 1. Id. at 880.
32. Id. at881.
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strapped to the gurney. 33 With this evidence, Coalition was able to
refute the government's claim under the first prong.
The Ninth Circuit considered arguendo that the first prong was
met and continued analyzing the rest of the Turnertest. The appellate
court found that the government did not sufficiently meet the second
prong of the Turner test.34 The government argued that there was an
alternative solution, to have the staff inform the public about the pregurney events in order to eliminate "independent, public eyewitness
observation[s]," but the appellate court found
the alternative would
35
impede the public's right to view executions.
The Ninth Circuit also found that the third prong was defeated.
The appellate court considered the impact of accommodating the
media's rights and held that there was insufficient evidence to show
that staff would be unwilling to carry out the execution rocess
because they feared identification and "threats or violence." 6 The
appellate court also reasoned that speculation alone was not enough
to show that extending media the right to view would "strain prison
resources."37
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit found the fourth prong requiring lowcost alternatives to accommodate the public's right of access without
diminishing the concerns of the government was not satisfied. The
appellate court found that "'[tihe use of surgical garb is a practical
alternative to restricting access to witness lethal injection executions
in order to conceal the identity of such execution staff....
The Ninth Circuit held that the Turner test was not met because
each of the prongs were not satisfied. 39 As a result, the appellate
court found that Procedure 770 "is [not] reasonably related to the
prison officials' legitimate interest in the safety of prison staff
and.., viewing restrictions are an exaggerated response., 40 Thus,
the appellate court held that Procedure 770 was both an exaggerated

33. Id. at 881-82.

34. See id. at 883.
35. Id. at 883.
36. Id. at 884.
37. See id.

38. Id. at 885 (quoting Cal. First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, No.
C-96-1291-VRW, 2000 WL 33173913, at *6(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2000)).
39. Id.
40. See id. at 885.
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response by prison officials to safety and security, and an
unconstitutional restriction on the media's First Amendment rights.4 '
IV. ANALYSIS
This Comment addresses the method of reasoning the Ninth
Circuit used to conclude that Procedure 770 is unconstitutional. The
appellate court utilized the Turner test for the first time as applied to
the media's asserted rights as opposed to those of the prisoner. 42
However, the appellate court overlooked prisoners' rights in
applying the test by balancing only the interests of the prison
officials and the media. This Comment analyzes each of the prongs
of the Turner test and balances the rights and interests of the prison
officials, the media, and the inmates. If the Ninth Circuit had
balanced the interests of all individuals affected by Procedure 770, it
may have reached a different result, finding Procedure 770
constitutional.
A. The Development and Purposeof Right to View Statutes

Public executions originated in England, where the purpose was
to "deter the commission of further crimes by other persons." 43 In
this country, the purpose is to give assurance to the public that the
judicial system is fair, to convey that "'both the process and its
results"' are adequate, and to ensure justice has been accomplished.44
By the mid-i 800s, the public became concerned with violence in the
streets due to public executions, and the states began moving
executions behind prison walls. 45 Nonetheless, the right to view
executions was preserved.
The right of certain members of the public, chosen by the
Attorney General, to view executions was established by the
41. See id

42. See id at 878.
43. John P. Rutledge, The Definitive Inhumanity of Capital Punishment, 20
WHITTIER L. REV. 283, 290 (1998).
44. Jeff Angeja, Note, Televising California's Death Penalty: Is There a
ConstitutionalRight to BroadcastExecutions?, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1489, 149 192 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,
488 U.S. 555, 571 (1980)).
45. See Rutledge, supra note 43, at 290-92 (explaining that in 1891
California moved public executions to county jails because of various reasons
including violence in the streets and public opposition of the death penalty).
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California Penal Code. 46 There are various arguments supporting the
enactment of such statutes. 47 In addition to the public's education
with respect to law and methods of government, public viewing of
executions
also provides assurance that the judicial system is at
48
work.
Historically, the media's main purpose during executions was to
communicate to the public governmental functions, thus performing
one of the many checks on the system and assuring that justice was
being conducted fairly.49 Up until the 1900s, the media continued to
fulfill this purpose, but in a limited way. 50 "'[N]ewsmen have no
constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that
afforded to the general public.'" '51 This limitation is largely due to
the presence of other rights and interests involved.
The interests and rights of the inmates, the public, and the prison
officials are implicated when the public encounters inmates in a
prison. 52 Therefore, since the execution process occurs in a prison, it
involves First Amendment rights of the media, privacy rights of the
inmates awaiting execution, as well as penological interests of
government, prison officials, and staff. To understand the
constitutionality of Procedure 770, each of the above-mentioned
interests must be weighed and balanced.
B. The SubstantiallyAffected Interests Surrounding
an Execution Process
In general, the prison system is "both newsworthy and of great
public importance," 53 and thus deserving of a constitutionally
46. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3605 (Deering 2002).
47. See generally Michael L. Goodwin, Note, An Eyeful for an Eye-An
Argument Against Allowing the Families of Murder Victims to View
Executions, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 585 (1997) (explaining various policy and
constitutional arguments including lack of satisfaction and cruel and unusual
punishment).
48. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572
(1980).
49. See Angeja, supranote 44, at 1497.
50. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978).
51. Id. at 7 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974)).
52. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830-32 (1974) (discussing the
various rights implicated in association with prison visitations).
53. See id. at 830 n.7 (quoting Warren Burger, Our Options are Limited, 18
VILL. L. REv. 165, 167 (1972)).
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protected right of access. The Ninth Circuit in Woodford sufficiently
analyzed the Turner test by addressing the concerns of the prison
officials when evaluating the constitutionality of Procedure 770. 54
However, the appellate court should have given more credence to the
prison officials' opinions regarding the penological interests because
55
of their expertise in administering and regulating prisons.
1. Great deference should be given to the expertise
of prison officials
In 1992, prison officials enacted Procedure 770 in light of major
concerns for staff and institutional safety. Prison officials believe
Procedure 770 is necessary to protect the identity of the execution
team from threats and retaliation by prisoners and death penalty
opponents. 56 In Entertainment Network, Inc. v. Lappin, the court
analyzed First Amendment rights in filming and broadcasting
executions. 57 By holding that the prohibition of broadcasting
executions does not infringe on First Amendment rights, the court
recognized that broadcasting would "'violate the privacy and
seriously put at risk the safety of those charged with implementing
the sentence of death.' 58 Similarly, without Procedure 770 there is a
risk for the safety and anonymity of prison officials.
In California, the warden has the authority to operate and control
the prison and execution process. 59 Many wardens have expressed
that during execution time, safety is of heightened concern because
60
the prisoners become "extremely tense, hostile and aggressive.'
By holding Procedure 770 unconstitutional, the prison staff's safety
is now of even greater concern. The appellate court has given
54. See Woodford, 299 F.3d at 878-79.
55. Entm't Network, Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1018 (S.D. Ind.
2001). This court suggests that courts should defer to the expert judgments of
correctional officials. Id. (citing Cal. First Amendment Coalition v. Calderon,
150 F.3d 976, 982-83 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also Woodford, 299 F.3d at 884
(recognizing that deference should be given to the discretion of prison officials
when considering the impact of accommodating the media's rights would have
on the prison system).
56. Woodford, 299 F.3d at 880.
57. Lappin, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1018.
58. Id. (quoting Warden Lappin's affidavit).
59. See KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, No. C 90-1383 RHS, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21163, at 7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 1992).
60. Id.
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witnesses the ability to view the inmate entering the execution
chamber, prison staff strapping the inmate to the gurney and
inserting the intravenous lines. 6 1 As a result, the extension of viewing
time increases the possibility of the witnesses identifying the staff,
whereas before, the witnesses only observed the inmate after the
execution team exited the chamber.
The safety concern stemming from prisoner hostility was
considered in Woodford when the prison officials argued that the
staff has their backs turned away from the witnesses so that the
inmate has the opportunity to seek retaliation by identifying the staff
to the outside world.63 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit found that
even with the regulation in place, the inmate64has the ability to reveal
the identity of the staff before the execution.
Another concern that the prison officials raised is that staff will
be deterred from participating in the execution process. 65 This is
largely due to fear for their lives as well as those of their family. As
Coalition argued, it is possible for the staff to wear masks to safely
conceal their identity without hindering the execution process.
However, considering that the inmate will be aggressive during the
process of being placed on the gurney, there is a valid risk that the
mask will be dislodged or become a distraction.67 Although it is
difficult to predict accurately what would happen if this alternative
were adopted, the mere presence of risk should lead the appellate
court to defer to the judgment of the prison officials because they are
familiar with the execution process. Instead, the Ninth Circuit found
fear is insufficient to be a legitimate governmental
that a speculative
68
concern.
An additional factor to consider is the effect upon the inmate
awaiting execution. When witnesses view the inmate being led to the
chamber, being strapped to the gurney and given the intravenous
61. See Woodford, 299 F.3d at 871.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 881.

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 881-82.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 884-85.
See id. at 871, 883, 885 (explaining the process of securing the inmate

on the gurney and describing how hostile, combative, and forceful the process

may become).
at 882-83.
68. Id.
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lines, the inmate may feel more degraded than when the inmate is
Furthermore,
already strapped to the gurney and sedated. 69
"[s]ociologists recognize that prisoners deprived of any sense of
individuality devalue themselves and others and therefore are more
prone to violence toward themselves or others." 70 Consequently,
without Procedure 770, the aggression and tension in the prison
population would be heightened, further supporting the prison
officials' concern for safety.
2. The right to privacy plays a crucial role during
an inmate's execution
According to the Turner test, the balanced interests are those
asserted (First Amendment rights of the media) and legitimate
penological interests. However, an inmate's rights are involved to
"the extent to which accommodation of the asserted right will have
,71 During
an impact on prison staff, [and] on inmates' liberty ....
the execution process, an inmate's right to privacy is at issue. Death
72
is personal and has been recognized to be a fundamental right.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit should not have overlooked the inmate's
right to privacy when public viewing of executions was at issue in
the case.
The right to privacy is recognized implicitly by the United States
Constitution and the California Constitution, which states that "all
people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty...73
and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.,
Inmates retain constitutional rights as long as they are not
74
inconsistent with other interests and concerns of the prison system.
Given that the prison system's safety concerns are consistent with a
prisoner's right to privacy and that the judiciary has deferred to the

at 883 (explaining the inmate's demeanor before execution).
69. Id.
70. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 552-53 (1984) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting).
71. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 78 (1987).
72. See Goodwin, supra note 47, at 602.
73. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
74. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
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concerns of prison officials, there are arguments that weigh in favor
of preserving an inmate's right to privacy.75
By holding Procedure 770 unconstitutional, the Ninth Circuit
denigrated the inmate's right to privacy because now witnesses can
view the entire execution process, as they did in the historical public
arena. In Houchins v. KQED,7 6 Inc., the media wanted uncensored
access to a prison, but the court recognized that inmates "are not like
animals in a zoo to be filmed and photographed at will by the public
or by media reporters, however 'educational' the process may be for
others." 77 By analogy, extending the right to view the execution
from the moment the inmate enters the chamber leaves nothing
censored, and leaves little, if any, privacy for an inmate.
C. The Impact of Procedure 770 on the Right to Privacy
The justification for allowing the public to view executions is
that it deters individuals from committing inhumane and immoral
crimes. 78 That justification is advanced when witnesses can view the
details of the execution such as the demeanor, the procedure, and the
process of securing the inmate on the gurney with intravenous lines
in place. 79 Despite the importance of these interests, extending the
right to view contradicts the reason why our nation moved to
privatize public executions-to reduce public hostility stemming
from viewing executions-and overlooks additional interests
involved, including those of the inmate and prison officials.
1. The primary concern considered during an execution
There are strong arguments in favor of treating an inmate's right
to privacy rather than the media and public's right to view
executions, as a primary concern. In balancing the media's interests
and the prisoner's interests, the prisoner's interests and rights far
75. See KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, No. C 90-1383 RHS, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21163, at '5(N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 1992); see also Entm't Network Inc. v.
Lappin, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1018 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (discussing arguments

made by Warden Lappin such as maintaining safety and anonymity, and that
courts should defer to correction officials for execution procedures).
76. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
77. Id.
at 5 n.2.
78. See Michael Madow, ForbiddenSpectacle: Executions, the Public and
the Press in Nineteenth Century New York, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 461, 557 (1995).

79. See Woodford, 299 F.3d at 883; see also supraPart I.
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outweigh those of the media. The right to privacy is a fundamental
right recognized by the U.S. Constitution.80 Allowing the media to
view the entire execution process compromises this right to a great
extent.
A prisoner's right to privacy is not comparable to a citizen's
right to privacy due to a prisoner's societal status. 8 1 However, this
does not mean the courts should abrogate this right completely when
faced with balancing constitutional rights of parties.
Justice Brennan acknowledged that "concern for decency and
human dignity... has compelled changes in the circumstances
surrounding the execution itself. No longer does our society
countenance the spectacle of public executions.., we reject public
executions as debasing and brutalizing to us all." 82 If society
understands that executions are "debasing and brutalizing to us all"
and an inmate's privacy rights are challenged by the ability of the
media to see the events behind the curtain, then inmates' privacy
rights may be compromised by an abrogation of Procedure 770.
Although inmates' rights are severely limited because of their status
as criminals, case law and the California and U.S. Constitutions have
suggested that they still retain privacy rights.
Case law and the California Constitution establish that criminals
retain the right to privacy.83 As expressed in Meachum v. Fano,s4
"even the inmate retains an unalienable interest in liberty-at the
very minimum the right to be treated with dignity-which the
Constitution may never ignore." 85 Additionally, commentators have
suggested that the prisoner is punished by virtue of being a spectacle
because this leads to feelings of shame and humiliation. 6 Thus a
limitation to an inmate's right to privacy exists at the time of
execution.

80. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 5 n.2; see also Goodwin, supra note 47, at 602.
81. See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 5 n.2 (observing that inmates lose many, but
not all rights when lawfully confined).
82. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 297 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
83. Angeja, supra note 44, at 1507.
84. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
85. Id. at 233.
86. Doug Janicik, Note, Allowing Victims' Families to View Executions:
The Eighth Amendment and Society's Justificationsfor Punishment, 61 OHIO
ST. L.J. 935, 944-45 (2000).
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The right to privacy has been defined as a liberty interest
including life, death, and marriage. 87 Death is personal, and when
awaiting death a person feels vulnerable and anxious.88 The Ninth
Circuit in Woodford implicitly expresses that an inmate may feel
humiliated and shamed as soon as he enters the chamber, while
awaiting the end of life. 89 Without Procedure 770, witnesses will
now view the inmate entering the chamber. At this time, the inmate
is hostile and may struggle with the staff while resisting being
secured on the gurney. 90 The struggle is probably a result of two
factors. First, when the inmate enters the chamber with witnesses
already present, the inmate is deprived of any right "to die with
dignity and peace," 91 and he is left with a sense of depravity,
humiliation, and shame. Second, the inmate has a build-up of
anxiety, hostility, and tension since the time he becomes aware of the
impending
execution; this build-up contributes to the inmate's
92
angst.
2. Limiting the media's First Amendment rights is justified
The media's First Amendment rights are limited, and rights of
inmates are constitutionally protected. In light of Procedure 770,
both the media's rights and prisoners' rights are limited in different
respects. Today, the media is unable to bring cameras into the
93
execution area, or participate in the selection method of executions.
Justification for such limitations includes avoiding the risk of danger
94
and violence to both witnesses and prison officials.
Inmates' rights are not explicitly mentioned in the right-to-view
statutes, and the rights consist of only limited privacy rights that are
in accordance with their prisoner status. 95 However, according to

87. Goodwin, supranote 47, at 602.

88. Id.
89. See Woodford, 299 F.3d at 883 (describing the events taking place

behind the curtain, and how "hostile and combative" the inmate is).

90. Id.
91. Janicik, supra note 86, at 944-45.
92. KqED, Inc. v. Vasquez, No. C 90-1383 RHS, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21163, at 7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 1992) (explaining the tension occurring in the
prison population during execution times).
93. Id. at* 11.
94. Id. at *7-11.
95. See Angeja, supra note 44, at 1507.
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Justice Stevens, the courts have a special obligation to protect
prisoners because they are a "'discrete and insular minority"' who
depend on the courts to make certain their rights are protected
because prisoners are unable to assert their rights sufficiently while
existing outside of society.
However, Coalition asserted that (1) the media should have the
right to report the events behind the curtain in order to contribute to
an informed public debate, and (2) without the media's report, the
"independent, public eyewitness observation of several crucial steps
of the execution process" would be eliminated. 97 Nevertheless,
contrary to this view is a recommendation from the Gerry
Commission, an organization that investigated privatization of the
penal system.
The Gerry Commission recommended that it should be a crime
to report details of executions because it has been known "to
stimulate others to the commission of crime." This is so because
repeating details of executions "creates with many a vicious and
morbid appetite for the disgusting description." 98
Coalition's
contention that the events behind the curtain are crucial for access to
governmental proceedings may not be as crucial considering the
effect it may have on the public.
Considering the above-described factors, the Ninth Circuit
should have regarded the prisoners' right to privacy when
considering the constitutionality of Procedure 770. Had the appellate
court considered that holding Procedure 770 unconstitutional would
abrogate prisoners' right to privacy, it might not have given the
media the right to view executions when the inmate is led to the
execution chamber. The Ninth Circuit might also have noted that
this would not be an infringement of the media's constitutional
rights, while maintaining prisoners' constitutional right to privacy.

96. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 557 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)

(quoting Bemal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 222 n.7 (1984)).
97. Woodford, 299 F.3d at 883-84.
98. Madow, supra note 78, at 541 (quoting GERRY COMM'N, REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT THE MOST HUMANE AND

PRACTICAL METHOD OF CARRYING INTO EFFECT THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IN
CAPITAL CASES, S. REP. No. 17, at 81 (N.Y. 1888)).
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V. THE FUTURE AFTER WOODFORD

The Ninth Circuit's holding that Procedure 770 is
unconstitutional may be analogous to viewing executions on
television, or reading about them in detail in newspapers. A
regression away from privatization occurs by extending the right to
view executions and eliminating the restrictions that the prison
system has imposed. The purpose of moving toward a more private
execution is to avoid the degradation caused to prisoners and to deter
the violence that erupts in the streets during and after executions. 99
By depicting the images and demeanor of the inmate in detail, from
the time the inmate enters the chamber up until the time of death
(whether on paper, on television, or by live and in-person speeches),
the entire execution process may be conveyed to the public.
A. The Regression Toward Public Executions
Just as the public may be desensitized or appalled by violence
on television, conveying the entire execution in detail with paper
reports will likely lead to the same result, considering the history of
public executions. For example, images of violence in various forms
today still raise serious concerns about its influence of increasing
00
incidents of violence in society.'
If the Ninth Circuit held Procedure 770 constitutional, the media
could still carry out the one essential function they were initially
prescribed to carry out when they were given the right-to-view
executions. One of the first right-to-view acts, passed in New York
in 1835, gave the press the right to view private executions only with
the permission of the sheriff and a sufficient explanation.' 0' The
sheriff admitted the press in order to have them publish an "official
certificate of execution-stating the bare fact that the death sentence
had been carried out in accordance with the law."' 1 2 Thus, the role

99. Id.at 494.
100. Philip R. Wiese, Comment, POPCORN and PRIMETIME vs.
PROTOCAL: An Examination of the Televised Execution Issue, 23 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 257, 281-82 (1996).
101. See Madow, supra note 78, at 519.
102. Id.at 520.
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of the media would remain intact while protecting the interests of the
public, the prison officials, and the inmates.
B. The UncertainEffect on the Public
As a consequence of Woodford, the public will now receive
detailed descriptions of the violent struggle of the inmate while being
secured on the gurney. The public will witness the force that may be
necessary to insert the intravenous lines. The public might be
horrified by the details, desensitized by them, 10 3 or "shamed into
abolishing executions.' 0 4 It is also possible that the public will be
strongly deterred from committing crimes because they are now
knowledgeable about each detail of the execution process, and they
are certain it is being carried out.10 5 The effect on the public is
speculative, but what is definite is that the inmate's right to privacy
has been eradicated.
VI. CONCLUSION

Extending the right to view executions affects the ideas of the
public and denigrates the rights of both inmates and prison officials.
In light of the Turner test, as applied to the media's First
Amendment rights, an inmate's right to privacy should not be
ignored.
Detailed reporting and broadcasting of executions
eliminates an inmate's right to privacy by communicating each detail
of their death to the world, with nothing kept private. Although
right-to-view statutes generally limit an inmate's rights, those rights
are now wholly excluded from the execution process in California.
The unconstitutionality of Procedure 770 will also have an effect
on the media, the public, and the prison officials. The media is now
able to report executions in detail to the public, possibly leading to
desensitized feelings about executions or motivation to abolish
executions. Prison officials now need to rethink the execution
process and expend prison resources for providing methods to ensure
staff safety and institutional security.
Unfortunately, the
ramifications of Woodford seem grim and regressive. The extension

103. Wiese, supra note 100, at 281-84.
104. Rutledge, supra note 43, at 305.
105. See Angeja, supra note 44, at 1497-98; see also Weise, supranote 100,

at 282.
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of the First Amendment rights of the media, at the expense of the
State's right to regulate prison facilities and the inmate's right to
privacy, may be a dangerous step backward in constitutional law.
Imbar Sagi
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